Duncans in Bedford Co. PA


Duncan research files of
Mary Ann (Duncan) Dobson
the Genealogy Bug

Last revised February 11, 2013

Formed 1771 from Cumberland
Northumberland formed 1772 from Lancaster, Bedford, Berks, and Northampton
Westmoreland formed 1773 from Bedford
Huntingdon formed 1787 from Bedford
Somerset formed 1795 from Bedford
Cambria formed 1804 from Somerset, Bedford, Huntingdon
Blair formed 1846 from Huntingdon, Bedford
Fulton formed 1850 from Bedford


1790 Bedford Co. PA Census
Pg. 20  Dunkin, Joseph       114xx

1820 Bedford Co. PA Census
Pg. 32  Morgan Duncan        100001      - 30010        Greenfield

1830 Bedford Co. PA Census
Pg. 71  Morgan Duncan        0110,001    - 0132,001     Greenfield
    84  James Duncan         1200,102    - 2110,01      Hopewell
   102  Joseph Duncan        1200,11     - 2010,1       Napier
   107  Joseph W. Duncan     0000,3      - 0010,3       Providence

1840 Bedford Co. PA Census
Pg.235  J.W. Duncan          0011,31     - 1100,01      Bedford
   318  Joseph Duncan        2112,01     - 1101,11      St. Claire
           (MAD: 1850 Marshall Co. W.VA)
   335  Morgan Duncan        0002,0001   - 0000,001     Greenfield

1850 Bedford Co. PA Census
Middle Woodbury
Pg.239, #223, Robert DUNCAN 49 PA miner
                  Elisabeth 31 PA
                  James (sic) 16, William 14 PA
                  Isabella 12, Sarah 8 PA
                  Matilda 1 PA
                  David RAY 30 PA
                  John DUNCAN 10, Jane? A?. (f) 6 PA
                  (MAD: Jane? was written over another name; ?? see Adams Co. IL ?? query; 1860 Henry Co. IL census)

1860 Bedford Co. PA Census
      No Duncan indexed

1870 Bedford Co. PA Census
Hopewell Twp.
Pg.483, #169-177, BRALLIA, David Jr.? 39 PA carpenter $800-$200
                  Christina 34 PA keeping house
                  Rubin 6, William 3, Mary J. 1 PA
Pg.483, #169-178, DUNCAN, Houghton (m) 25 ENG ore miner, parents of foreign birth
                  Nettie 23 NY keeping house
                  Annie 2 VT, father of foreign birth
Pg.483, #169-179, VIVIAN, Ellen 21 NY
                  Charles 4/12 NY b.Feby.
W. Providence Twp.
Pg.722, #138-146, DUNKIN, Haughten (m) 25 ENG works in mine $0-$100
                  Nettie 23 NY keeping house
                  Anna 2 VT, father of foreign birth
                  CRAWFORD, Alanson (m) 19 NY works in mine
                  BARNS, Thomas 20 ENG works in mine, parents of foreign birth


Go to the Bedford Co. PA Land Records


"Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme court of Pennsylvania; with some select cases at nisi prius and in the circuit courts" by the Honorable Jasper Yeates, one of the judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; "Yeates Reports" Vol.3, pgs.200 to 202 (California State Law Library, Sacramento, 1/2004)
      Lessee of SAMUEL MOBLEY, DENTON MOBLEY, WILLIAM MOBLEY, ROBERT CUNNINGHAM and MARGARET his wife, and SUSANNAH MOBLEY against CHRISTIAN OEKER; Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Lewiston; 3 Yeates 200; May, 1801, Decided.
      EJECTMENT for 214 acres on Clover creek, in Woodberry township.
      The lessors of the plaintiff founded their pretensions on an improvement made by their father, Ezekiel Mobley, on lands adjoining. He settled on those lands in 1774 or 1775, erected a small house with a garden, cleared 15 or 20 acres, and begun 2 or 3 acres for meadow. He claimed the lands from Clover creek, southerly to some marked trees between him and Michael Crydor, 363 perches distant. The good land extended easterly from the creek, about 125 perches to Tussey's mountain. He sold his claim to one tract, west of the creek; and also another tract north of his improvements, which fell back to him.
      The settlers were driven off by the Indians in 1777, and Mobley among the rest. He went to Maryland and there died.
      His widow returned to the lands in 1785, with her five children, the eldest about 15 and the youngest about 2 years old; and was assisted by her brother, William Philips, with corn and provisions. After some time she disposed of the tract north of the improvements which had fallen back to her husband, for the maintenance of the family; and being alarmed about their right to the tract whereon they lived, agreed in behalf of herself and family with her brother the said William Philips, that if he would secure to them 200 acres by an office right, he might have the residue for himself. She afterwards received a horse and cow as a further consideration for the improvement claim.
      Philips accordingly took out warrants and obtained surveys of 200 acres in the name of Susannah Mobley, and 214 acres and 90 perches for himself, which he afterwards patented and sold to the defendant for a valuable consideration. No improvements whatever were made on the lands in dispute, until after the survey was made for Philips in 1793.
      Before the parol evidence was gone into, the defendant's counsel objected, that the plaintiff was barred by the act of limitations of 26th March 1785, Sec. 5, (2 Dall. Laws, 282,) there having been no quiet and peaceable possession of the premises within seven years next before bringing the action.
      To this it was answered, that the widow had always been in the possession of the improved part of the lands, since the inhabitants returned to their settlements; and that if she was deprived of the possession of any part, it arose from the fraud or management of Philips, or her mistake in believing that an office right was indispensably necessary to hold the lands.
      The court said, it was morally impossible to form any judgment, whether there had been an abandonment of the premises or not, so widely did the counsel differ in their statements, until the evidence was fully heard. The legal objection might afterwards be taken up and decided on.
      The plaintiff's counsel then excepted to giving evidence of any contract or sale by the widow respecting the improvement claim. No act which she could do, could affect the rights of the children in their minority, in lands claimed by improvement, and ascertained on one side by a marked line; and for this was cited 2 Dall. 205, Duncan's lessee v. Walker.
      The court said, improvement rights were equitable claims which might be fortified by the acts of a widow during the minority of her children, by pursuing and continuing the first settlement. So also might they be abandoned and forfeited by her neglect. Evidence was equally applicable and relevant in both cases. It was impossible to lay down any general rule on the subject. Every case must depend on its own peculiar circumstances. The effect of the evidence must be judged of, after it had been received.
      After the evidence had been gone through, the court said, that they discovered nothing unfair or inequitable in the transaction of Philips with the widow. There were many years previous to 1791, when improvement rights were deemed to stand on a precarious footing. While this opinion generally prevailed, there was no impropriety in a widow's securing at least part of the land claimed. And in this instance, one of the adjoining tracts had been transferred by the improver in his life time, and two others had been disposed of by the widow after his death. The claim went to an unreasonable extent, and 200 acres had been secured to the family.
      It was agreed by the court, and all the counsel, on the question being made, that the 5th section of the limitation act of 26th March 1785, extended to and was binding on infants, where there had been no possession of the lands held under the improvement, for seven years next before the action brought. The preceding section contains a proviso in favour of infancy, coverture, &c., but here it is only in favour of those who have been driven from their possessions by force or terror, &c. and the previous part of the law runs thus:-- "unless he, she or they, or his, her or their ancestors or predecessors, have had the possession," &c. The law is general in its nature, and binds every member of the community, "for the quieting of estates and security of property."
      The plaintiff suffered a nonsuit.
      [Counsel] Messrs. Duncan and Walker, pro quer.
      Messrs. Hamilton and Henderson, pro def.

"Pennsylvania state reports, comprising cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania" cases decided May, October, and November 1861; by Robert E. Wright, Vol.IV; Vol.40, pgs.132 to 140 (California State Law Library, Sacramento, 2/2004)
      SHOENBERGER'S Executors versus HAY et al.; Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg; 40 Pa. 132; July 25, 1861, Decided.
      Error to the Common Pleas of Blair county.
      This was an action of debt brought in the court below to April Term 1859 by Simon G. Hay (for use of Jacob L. Martin), Samuel Brown, Mary Brown, Valentine Hay, Jacob Biddle, and Catharine Broombaugh, heirs and legal representatives of Valentine Hay, deceased, against John G. Miles and Michael Berry, executors of Peter Shoenberger, deceased, in which, after declaration filed, the following case was agreed upon and stated for the opinion of the court:--
      Valentine Hay died in the year 1816, seised of a tract of land in Bedford (now Blair) county, near Upper Maria Forge, having made a will, which was duly admitted to probate in Bedford county. That John Hay, executor of the said Valentine Hay, on the 22d day of July 1816, sold and conveyed the tract of land, of which the said Valentine Hay died seised, to George Hartle, for the sum of $1688.46. That George Hartle subsequently died, and proceedings having been instituted in the Orphans' Court of Bedford county, to make partition and valuation of the said tract of land to and among the heirs of the said George Hartle, and the heirs having all refused to accept the said tract of land at the valuation thereof, on the 28th day of November 1833 an order was issued out of the Orphans' Court of Bedford county to sell the said tract of land, "subject to the dower of the widow of Valentine Hay, deceased, in said premises."
      That in pursuance of the said order of the Orphans' Court of Bedford county, the said tract of land was sold on the 26th day of December 1833 to Samuel Green, for the sum of $825, "subject to the dower of the widow of Valentine Hay," and that said sale was confirmed by the said court on the 28th of January 1834. That Samuel Green sold the said tract of land, on the 4th day of April 1834, to Peter Shoenberger, for the sum of $825, "subject to the payment of the dower of the widow of the late Valentine Hay, deceased, which is $562.82." That the widow of the said Valentine Hay is deceased, and that the plaintiffs are the children and heirs of the said Valentine Hay. The will of Valentine Hay -- the deed of Valentine Hay's executor to Jacob Hartle -- the order of the Orphans' Court of Bedford county for the sale of said tract of land, and the deed by Samuel Green to Peter Shoenberger, and the will of Peter Shoenberger, are to be considered a part of the case stated. Dr. P. Shoenberger paid to the widow of Valentine Hay the annual interest on the dower, as it is called, down to the 1st April 1851, being the time when a lease for life or four years (in case of the testator not living to the end of the said four years), from the said Peter Shoenberger to John W. Duncan, commenced, after which time the said John W. Duncan paid whatever interest was paid, if any, to the said widow; which said lease is made a part of this case stated. Dr. Peter Shoenberger devised the tract of land, hereinbefore described, to his executors, in trust for the use of his daughter, Martha K. Duncan, for and during her natural life, and upon her death he devised the remainder to her children. The devise was made in the following form, that is to say:--
      "Seventhly. I devise to my executors, hereinafter named, the survivors and survivor of them, and to my administrators for the time being, with the will annexed, for and during the natural life of my daughter, Martha Duncan, in trust for the use and benefit of my said daughter, Martha Duncan, for and during her natural life, the following-described real estate, that is to say, Bloomfield Furnace, with all the lands and tenements thereto belonging, and of which the following is a schedule, viz.:" &c. (Then follows an enumeration and description of the lands by tracts.) "Also, I devise to my daughter, Martha Duncan, in trust as aforesaid and same manner, the Upper and Middle Maria Forges, with all the farms, lands, and tenements thereto belonging, situate in Blair county, and designated in the following schedule, viz.:" &c. (Then follows a list of tracts by description in detail, in which is included the Valentine Hay tract, hereinbefore mentioned.) After all the lands included in the devise aforesaid were described and enumerated, the will proceeds as follows, viz.: "And I direct that the rents, issues, and profits of the said hereinbefore-described real estate so devised in trust for the use and benefit of my daughter, Martha Duncan, shall be regularly and annually paid to my said daughter, Martha Duncan, for her sole and separate use, free from the control or disposition of her present or any other future husband whom she may at any time have during her natural life, and, upon her death, I devise the same to her surviving children, and the lawful issue of such of her children as shall be then dead, leaving lawful issue, as tenants in common, in equal shares, such issue to take, in equal parts, the share only which would have been taken by his, her, or their parent, had such parent been living at the time of the death of my said daughter, Martha Duncan, the said surviving children, and the lawful issue of such as shall be then dead at the time of the death of my said daughter, Martha, to have and to hold the said lands and tenements hereby devised to them, upon the death of my said daughter, Martha Duncan, as a remainder as purchasers, and not by descent."
      If the court be of opinion that the plaintiffs ought to recover from the defendants the dower that remains a charge upon the said tract of land, and subject to which Peter Shoenberger purchased the same, then judgment to be entered for the plaintiffs for the sum of $562.82, with interest from the 1st day of July 1854, the time of the death of the widow of Valentine Hay; but if not, then judgment to be entered for the defendants -- the costs to follow the judgment, and either party reserving the right to sue out a writ of error therein. Either party to have the right to take a writ of error.
      On hearing, the court below gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The case was thereupon removed into this court by the defendants, who assigned for error the entering of judgment for plaintiffs.
      J. G. MILES, for plaintiffs in error. -- The question is, Does Martha K. Duncan take the land devised cum onere, or must the charge which rested upon it in the lifetime of the testator be paid out of his residuary estate? It is believed that the case of Bell's Executors v. Bell, 32 Pa. 311, conclusively settles the point against the defendants in error. The decree of the Orphans' Court of Bedford county for the sale of the land as the property of George Hartle, deceased, ordering the sale to be made "subject to the dower of the widow of Valentine Hay, deceased, in said premises," the deed from Adam Black, administrator of Hartle, to Green, made in pursuance of and in conformity to the decree, and the deed from Green to Shoenberger, in the habendum of which, are the following clauses, viz.: "Subject, however, to the payment to the said Samuel Green of the sum of $550, part of the consideration-money above mentioned, and for which the said Peter Shoenberger has given his judgment-notes bearing even date herewith, and subject also to the payment of the dower of the widow of Valentine Hay, deceased, and which the above tract of land was subject to in the hands of the said Samuel Green," all show a charge in favour of the widow of Valentine Hay, standing in the title devised to Martha K. Duncan, similar in its nature to statutory dower, and so treated and called in the decree of the court and in the deeds themselves. A judicial sale of the land, as the property of either Green or Shoenberger, upon the judgment of a third person, would not have extinguished the charge in question: Dewalt's Appeal, 8 Harris 236. The case of Campbell v. Shrum, 3 Watts 60, cited to support the position taken by Hay's heirs, was the case of an action of covenant founded upon articles of agreement, sealed by both parties, in which the one party sued the other for not paying the debt of the first to a third person. The payment of that debt, under the terms of the agreement, was adjudged to be the principal consideration of it, and, therefore, in the case of an unexecuted contract, signed by both parties, held to amount to a covenant to pay it. It was very unlike the case of a deed conveying the legal title subject to a charge, which adhered to it in its various stages of transmission to the present owner, under the will of Dr. Shoenberger.
      In addition to the leading case of Bell v. Bell, the following authorities are clear to the point that the residuary estate is not liable upon the facts of the case: Keyzey's Executor v. Keyzey, 9 S. & R. 73; Toller on Executors 419; 2 P. Wms. 664; 4 Kent's Com. 421; Hoff's Appeal, 12 Harris 204; 1 Maddock's Ch. 592; 3 Ves. 128, note (a) under case of Woods v. Hunting-ford; Butler v. Butler, 5 Ves. 534.
      In the absence of any proof to that effect, two leading facts prove that Dr. Shoenberger did not make the debt in question his own:--
      1st. In the deed from Green to him there is evidence of a discrimination in that respect between the two dowers which encumbered the land at the same time, to wit, the one in question and the other in favour of the widow of Hartle. The one shows personal obligation, the other none.
      2d. The testator paid the annual interest to Mrs. Hay during the time only when he was in the possession of the land.
      E. HAMMOND, for defendant in error. -- The question presented for adjudication is not as stated by the plaintiffs in error, whether Martha Duncan takes the land devised, cum onere, but whether the estate of Dr. Shoenberger is bound to pay the claim set forth in the case stated?
      Dr. Shoenberger purchased the land from Samuel Green for $825, "subject to the payment of the dower of the widow of the late Valentine Hay, deceased, which is $562.82." This constituted, on the part of Dr. Shoenberger, an agreement to pay, in addition to the $825, the sum of $562.82. The payment of the sum of $562.82 is part of the consideration for which the land was conveyed to Dr. Shoenberger: Campbell v. Shrum, 3 Watts 60; Blank v. German, 5 W. & S. 36.
      It is evident that the estimated value of the land by Green and Dr. Shoenberger embraced the money for which this suit has been brought, and that it was deducted or retained by Dr. Shoenberger, he paying Green the estimated value of the land less the sum of $562.82. A conveyance in consideration of the assumption of a lien on the land renders the grantee liable to pay it, and is a valuable consideration.
      Whether covenant would be the proper form of action, where it appears that he had not executed the deed, but was a party to it, and held under the conveyance, it is unnecessary to decide; for if covenant would not lie, an action on the case would, and the agreement in writing would be sufficient evidence: Dubbs v. Finley, 2 Penna. State Rep. 397. But debt and not covenant is the proper action: Maule v. Weaver, 7 Pa. 329. See McCracken's Estate, 29 Penna. State Rep. 426, as to liability of defendant.
      In the case of Bell's Executor v. Bell, relied upon by the plaintiffs in error, there was no covenant to pay the "statutory dower in favour of a widow of a former owner." The suit was brought by the devisee of the land against the estate of the devisor.
      Dr. Shoenberger could not, by leasing or disposing of the land in any way, change his liability under the covenant and agreement in the deed by Green to him. In his will he directs his executors to pay his just debts and funeral expenses, and the expenses of the administration of his estate, out of his personal estate not hereinafter specifically bequeathed, and his real estate not specifically devised; and thereby intended the lands specifically devised in his will to pass to the devisees free from any encumbrance. It cannot be doubted that Dr. Shoenberger became personally liable to pay the sum of $562.82; and if so, his executors are directed to pay the same in his will.
      MILES, in reply. -- Dower is an estate in the nature of a rent-charge, not an encumbrance upon land: Power v. Power, 7 Watts 212; Thomas v. Simpson, 3 Pa. 69; 3 Id. 70; Shaupe v. Shaupe, 12 S. & R. 12. It is a continuing charge during the life of the widow of a deceased husband, different from the debts and encumbrances which formed the subject of the cases referred to in the argument of the counsel of the defendants in error: McCracken's Estate, 29 Pa. 428.
      Every case cited on the other side was ruled upon the force of an agreement back of the deed, except Maule v. Weaver, 7 Pa. 329, where it was held that an action of covenant could not be sustained against a grantee of a deed recited to be an indenture inter partes -- sealed alone by the grantor, in which was contained a covenant on the part of the grantee to pay a rent reserved out of the land. That was the only point ruled in the case.
      Our case is not that of a first grantee, but of a testator, who in his lifetime occupied the position of a third in the chain of connection between the original proprietor, Valentine Hay (the dower of whose widow was a charge upon the land), and the testator's devisee. It is clearly distinguishable from the cases relied upon in the opposite argument, and strictly within the ruling of Bell v. Bell. Dr. Shoenberger was a third grantee of the legal estate charged with a continuing dower, conveyed by a deed-poll subject to such charge. In regard to such a deed, the rule of construction would be different from that which would govern a paper sealed by both parties. See Poyntell v. Spencer, 6 Pa. 256. The principles settled after an elaborate discussion by most eminent counsel in the case of Walker v. Physick, 5 Pa. 193, must rule this case.
      This same principle is found in Royer v. Ake, 3 Penna. Rep. 464; Wiedner v. Foster, 2 Id. 25; Thomas v. Connell, 5 Pa. 14; Wickersham v. Irwin, 2 Harris 108, 110, 111; Berry v. McMullen, 17 S. & R. 87; Doe v. Provoost, 4 Johns. 66; Hogan v. Jackson, Cowper 304, 305.
      Upon the question of the intention of the testator, there is nothing in the will to take the case out of the rule laid down in the case of Bell v. Bell. The same reasons exist in this case as in that, for holding that there is a total absence of an intention manifested to exonerate the land from the charge, and to throw it upon the residuary fund.
      The opinion of the court was delivered, July 25th 1861, by
      THOMPSON, J. -- This was an action of debt against the plaintiffs in error, to enforce an alleged undertaking of their testator to pay off a dower; subject to which, on the 4th of April 1854, he purchased and accepted a conveyance of a certain piece or tract of land, formerly belonging to Valentine Hay, deceased, and which, by his will, he devised before the same became payable, to Mrs. Duncan, his daughter. Is it a debt chargeable to the residuary estate of Dr. Shoenberger, or does the devisee take the land cum onere?
      In the case of Wolveridge v. Steward, 3 Moore & Scott 561, it was held in the Exchequer Chamber (opinion of the court by Lord Denman, C. J.), on an indenture sealed by both parties, the words "subject nevertheless to the payment of the yearly rent and performance of the covenants and agreements reserved and contained in the said indenture of lease," &c., being inserted in the habendum, did not, without the intent otherwise appeared, imply an agreement or covenant to pay the rent and perform the covenants; that the words in that place naturally import or qualify the generality of the words which precede them, and his lordship cites the definition of the office of a habendum from Co. Litt. 6: "It doth qualify the general intendment of the premises; and the reason of this is, for that is a maxim of law, that every man's grant shall be taken by construction of law, most forcible against him." His lordship also in that opinion explains a seeming difference between that case and Barnett v. Lynch, 5 B. & C. 597, determined in the King's Bench. The difference arose out of the difference in the instruments, and perhaps form of action, but it is more apparent than real.
      Without affirming the principles of this case expressly, our court has done so impliedly, by looking, notwithstanding the words, to the entire agreement for the evidence of intent to make the debt or encumbrance the debt of the grantee in the conveyance. Thus, in McCracken's Estate, 29 Pa. 426, the intent was deduced from the act of the assignee buying but an equitable interest, and procuring an assignment of the contract between the original vendors and his assignor to himself; which it was thought evinced an intent to be bound as his assignee was bound. So, too, this intent was thought to be evinced by the testator's will, in the manner in which he devised his estate. So in Bell's Executors v. Bell, 32 Pa. 309, words such as exist here were held not sufficient of themselves against the improbability that any man would so contract as to tie up his estate indefinitely from final administration, until the widow's dower should become payable.
      In Walker v. Physick, 5 Pa. 193, the words were, "under and subject to the payment of the said rent, as the same shall accrue, for ever," in the habendum. Mr. Justice Kennedy, in an elaborate opinion at Nisi Prius, considered these words in the same light as did Lord Denman in Wolveridge v. Steward, as a qualification of the estate granted, and also to save responsibility under the words "grant, bargain, and sell." In affirming that case in banc, Gibson, C. J., says the true rule of interpretation is the intent of the parties. This of course denied to the words, per se, the effect of a covenant, or a personal promise to be liable. Many reasons, derived from results which might flow from holding them to have the force of an agreement to pay, are given in that case, proving what has already been said, that such a conveyance does not, per se, imply a personal covenant to pay without regard to the enjoyment of the property.
      The same principle was held in Wickersham v. Irwin, 14 Pa. 108. But Mr. Justice Rogers denied what has sometimes been asserted, that buying, subject to encumbrance merely, created no privity of contract. That the assignee, and so with his successors, were liable for ground-rent only on privity of estate arising from the "actual or beneficial enjoyment of the premises, or the right of possession and enjoyment."
      These authorities are sufficient to establish, beyond doubt, that the words in the habendum, in the deed by Green to Dr. Shoenberger, "subject also to the payment of the dower of the widow of Valentine Hay, deceased, and which the above tract of land was subject to in the hands of the said Samuel Green," do not, of themselves, the deed not being sealed by the latter, import a covenant or a promise by acceptance of it, to be personally answerable to discharge the dower. The dower having become due and payable after the doctor's death, and after the estate had passed by devise to Mrs. Duncan, upon no principle of privity of contract or estate is his estate answerable to discharge the encumbrance.
      As we see no indication whatever, outside of the words used, evincive of an intent to make the payment of the decree a personal obligation by the testator, we are clearly of opinion that the case must be reversed. It is not, in principle, distinguishable from Bell's Executors v. Bell, already cited, and which followed abundance of authority, as appears by the citations therein. In the case in hand, the dower was not even counted as part of the purchase-money. That was $825 for the land, "subject to the payment of the dower," &c., "which is $562.82." "I have no doubt," says Gibson, C.J., in Walker v. Physic, "that they actually meant no more than to say the grantee was to take an encumbered estate, without recourse to the grantor for a breach of the statutory covenant arising from the words "grant, bargain, and sell." And the fact that the encumbrance was not included in the purchase-money, is a strong circumstance that this was the understanding of the parties. I need do no more than to notice one or two cases relied on by the defendant in error.
      The facts of Campbell v. Shrum, 3 Watts 60, were, in some particulars, like those in McCracken's Estate. Shrum sold to Campbell, by articles of agreement, an equitable title, which agreement both parties signed and sealed. By these Campbell agreed to buy, for a consideration to Shrum, "subject to the payment of the purchase-money and interest now due, on articles of agreement between Thomas Netly and James Gibson of the one part, and the said Shrum of the other part." It is evident that the principal consideration for the sale to Campbell by Shrum, was, that the former should discharge the arrears then due by the latter, and for which he was liable to be called on at any moment. It was the evident intent apparent in the covenants, as appears in the opinion of the court, which led to the ruling there. No one can doubt its propriety, I think. But it does not conflict with the case in hand. The dower was not payable when Dr. Shoenberger bought, nor did it become so in his lifetime. The estate came to him charged with it, and it is evident he took it to hold as encumbered.
      The only other case to be noticed is Maule v. Weaver, 7 Pa. 329. We may dismiss it with the only remark remaining, in view of the case before us, and that is, that the point there decided was that covenant does not lie against a party who has not signed or sealed the instrument sued on. No point of that kind arises here. This was an action of debt, and as there can be no doubt but that it would lie in all cases for the recovery of a specific sum of money, we see no objection to the form of action.
      But for the reasons assigned, the judgment is reversed.
      Judgment reversed, and judgment for the defendants, with costs.


"Pennsylvania Archives" Series Three, Vol.XXII, ed. by W.H. Egle; pub. 1897 (Google book, 4/22/2010)
      Returns of taxables for the counties of Bedford (1773 to 1784), Huntingdon (1788), Westmoreland (1783, 1786), Fayette (1784, 1786) Allegheny (1791), Washington (1786), and census of Bedford (1784) and Westmoreland (1783)
   Pg.21, Transcript of Taxables, County of Bedford, 1773, Armstrong Township
      Duncan, David, 1.6 tax
      (Pg.23) Uncultivated lands, Samuel Duncan, 15.0 tax
   Pg.192, Return of Property, Bedford County, 1779, Dublin Township
      Non-Residents, Steven Duncan, 200 acres
   Pg.249, Supply Tax, County of Bedford, 1783, Sherley Township
      Duncan, Stephen, near Sherley old town, 150 acres, 2.10.0 tax
   Pg.303, Return of Lands, etc., County of Bedford, 1784, Sherley Township
      Non-Residents, Duncan, Stephen, 150 acres


Armstrong Co. PA Deeds (SLC 9/15/2012)
      10-329/330: Letter of attorney. 12 April 1837, Ellen Duncan of Borough of Carlisle, Cumberland Co. PA, appoint John Duncan of Shippensburg, twp., county & state afsd, to be my attorney ... tracts of land in Counties of Mifflin, Huntingdon, Cambria, Bedford, Indiana and Armstrong, and make deeds ... /s/ Ellen Duncan. Ack. in Cumberland Co. PA. Recorded April 25, 1837. (FHL film 861,228)

Cumberland Co. PA Deeds
      S-53/55: 5 Dec. 1807, Samuel Robinson of PA, Practitionery of Physic, and wife Mary Serena to James Duncan of Cumberland Co. PA, Attorney at Law, for $1, sell messuage and tract or parcel of land on the River Mississippi at or near the Tunica Village containing 500 acres more or less, being the same premises which Lucetta Pollock of City of Philadelphia and now decd. by her will devised to the said Mary Serena Robinson, and also all other lands etc. within the bounds of the Government of Baton Rouge or other dominions of his Catholic Majesty or within the Mississippi Territory or other Territorial Government of the US, and also all houses, lots of ground and tracts of land situate in the counties of Cumberland, Center, Northumberland, Lycoming, Bedford, Mifflin and Westmoreland in the State of Pennsylvania or in other parts of said state which James Pollock late of Borough of Carlisle devised to afsd Mary Serena and others and whereof a moiety became vested in said Mary Serena on the decease of the afsd Lucetta Pollock ... together with all improvements ... Samuel Robinson and wife Mary ... /s/ Saml. Robinson, Mary S. Robinson. Wit. Craven N. Luckett, James Green, for Samuel Robinson; Arch. Loudon and H.H. Brackenridge for Mary Serena Robinson. Recorded 16 Jan. 1808. (FHL film 21,055; SLC 9/9/2010; edges of pages very dark to very light)

Somerset Co. PA Deed (SLC 6/4/2011)
      4-155: 20 Feb. 1794, an application was lately made by Robt Duncan for a grant of land in Bedford Co., a warrant or order was issued for surveying the same for my use, now I the said Robt. Duncan for 5 shillings specie to me paid by Dr. Benjamin Rush, as well as for other good causes, ... have sold to said Dr. Benjamin Rush the above tract of land with appurtenances and my claim ... to the lands which may be granted or surveyed by virtue of the application ... /s/ Robert Duncan. Wit. Joseph Allen. Robert Duncan appeared 21 Feb. 1794 before Wm. Brown Esq., one of assistant Judges of Mifflin Co. Recorded Oct. 9, 1805. (FHL film 558,758; SLC 6/4/2011)

HISTORIES before 1923

"History of Bedford, Somerset, and Fulton Counties, Pennsylvania : with illustrations and biographical sketches of some of its pioneers and prominent men." by Joseph Shippen; pub. Chicago: Waterman, Watkins & Co., 1884, 780 pgs (LH11287, HeritageQuest images 6/2007; FHL book 974.87 H2w and film 873,502)
      Did not copy Civil War soldiers
      Pg.205: The Bar. Since the formation of Bedford county ... Samuel Duncan, Admitted Nov. term 1801.
      Pg.208: (MAD: ca 1784? or 1791?) ... and Samuel Duncan were, all of them, residents of the town of Bedford, and prominent attorneys in this part of the state during the closing years of the last century. ...
      Pg.220: Treasurers (Bedford Co.) ... Joseph W. Duncan, 1841.
      Pg.251: Borough of Bedford. 1840 ... Joseph W. Duncan, innkeeper. ...
      Pg.341-342: Bloomfield. Bloomfield Furnace, built from the material of the Elizabeth furnace in Woodberry, was erected in 1845, and put in operation the following year. It was owned by Dr. P. Schoenberger until 1851, when, by his will, it passed into the possession of the Duncan heirs. The furnace has not been in operation for several years. While the business was active, Bloomfield was a very lively place. (MAD: Bedford Co.)


"Decatur Daily Review" Decatur, Illinois, August 30, 1886 (transcription by and from Kathy Cawley 3/2004)
      John Duncan killed his brother-in-law, Jeremiah Plecker, at Bedford, Pa.


"Western PA Gen. Society Quarterly" Vol.3, 1976-77 (copy of page from Deone Penquite 9/1991; to her 11/1982 from Western PA Gen. Society)
      Pg.63: This issue of the periodical includes information from the Bible of Joseph Duncan born PA 1790, d. 1860, married 1817 to Catherine; children include Thomas Jefferson Davis Duncan, b. Feb. 19, 1836. (MAD: Davis Duncan mar. 1863 Wood Co. WV; see 1850 Marshall Co. (W)VA census; 1860 Marshall Co. IL census; probably Bedford Co. PA 1830-1840)


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