GARRARD CO. KY
COURT RECORDS
 

Garrard County, KY, Circuit Court (Researched and transcribed by Garland D. Vinyard, posted with his permission, his comments)
      Book 7, pg.331, "September Term 1822, No. 377-13- under 50. This cause be reminded to the Rochcastle Circuit Court for trail.
            Richard P. Bruce Compt. vs Stephen C. Duncan Deft. } SS. This day came the parties by their counsel and the notice given to dissolve the litigation herein being returned executed in due time. And after hearing the Bill assigned and due arguments of counsel it is considered that the litigation be dissolved and that the defendant be permitted to have the benefit of his agreement at law and recover of the court the sum of $5.70 being ten percent on the amount of the judgement enjoined and it is finally decreed and ordered that the defendant recover of the Compt. His costs therein expended and that he may have execution therefor or the manner is." [ED. - Stephen Duncan lost the case and paid $57.00 + 10% (5.70) to Richard Bruce the complainant.]
      Book 8, pg.285, "June Term 1824, No. 412, Stephen C. Duncan, compt. Vs Abraham Grinstaff Defts.} Chy.
            It appearing from the sheriffs return that the subpoena to all ad respondence? herein was executed on the defendant sale on the 11th day of August 1819 and he having failed to appear and answer the compt. bill, therefore on the motion of the Court by his Counsel. It is decreed and ordered that the bill of the compt. be and the same is hereby taken as compt. against the defendant Ball And this cause having been heard on the Deft. and attorney's depositions as to the other defendants and now heard on the bill dispositions and exhibits as to the Deft. Ball and the Court being now sufficiently advised of and concerning the premises, give the following as their opinion and decree. It satisfactorily appears that the defendant Ball sold and bound himself to comply to the defendant Grinstaff 54 1/2 acres of land in the Bill mentioned, and that Grinstaff sold and bound himself to convey the same to the Compt. It moreover appears that three acres and ninety seven poles part of said land is not within claims of said Bal. but is embraced by the claims of Deft. Deed and that Deft. had not title thereto, and that compt. Is willing to take the residual of the 54 1/4 acres and compensation for the residue. It is therefore decreed and ordered that the deft. Ball due on or before the first day of August next be and is fee simple and with cause of general warrant, convey to the Compt. The forty nine acres of land it being the residue of the 54 1/4 acres which is accepted and designated on the plats returned in this cause by ? the court is of opinion that the complainant is entitled to compensation for the three acres and ninety seven poles after the rate of $10 per acre amounting to $36.10. It appears that $30 of the settlement at law is still enjoined. It is farther decreed and ordered that the injunction be made perpetual as to that ? and that the Compt. recover against the defendant Grinstaff the further sum of $10. It is further decreed and ordered that the Bill as to the defendant Reid be assigned. It is finally decreed and ordered that the complainant recover against the other defendants his cost in this suit appended." [ED - The defendant Abraham Grinstaff probably brokered the land of James Ball sold to Stephen Duncan on March 10, 1820, but about 5 acres belonged to Reid. Grinstaff failed to appear in court and as such lost the case. Duncan accepted the lesser amount of the land plus a rebate for the land not received. It appears that Reid sold the disputed land to Duncan, since 54 1/2 acres were sold to William Beaumont by Stephen Duncan in 1926.]
 

"Reports of select cases decided in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky" ("Kentucky Reports" [Vol.] 34-35 - DANA IV-V) by James G. Dana, in 9 Volumes, Vol.IV; Vol.34, pg.511 to 516 (California State Law Library 12/2003)
      The COMMONWEALTH (SALLY HILL Relator) vs. GEORGE TURNER; Court of Appeals of Kentucky; 34 Ky. 511; 4 Dana 511; October 22, 1836, Decided.
      From the Garrard County Court.
      Chief Justice ROBERTSON delivered the Opinion of the Court. George Turner, having been recognized to appear in the Garrard County Court, on a charge of being the father of a bastard child borne by Sally Hill, appeared in discharge of his recognizance, and -- notwithstanding the opposition of said Sally and of the attorney for the county, was discharged by the Court, upon proof of the following writing:-- "For and in consideration of the sum of one hundred dollars, to me this day paid by one horse beast at forty, and six ten dollar notes to be paid in six annual instalments, I hereby discharge George Turner from two prosecutions in bastardy set on foot against him by me, in the Garrard County Court, for the use and benefit of my two infant children Mary Jane and Martha Ann Hill -- and I further agree, never to commence any further prosecution against him, for their benefit, nor will I permit any person to do so in my name; and I hereby direct the attorney for the county, and the Court, to dismiss the prosecutions pending in the County Court aforesaid, against him. Given from under my hand this 21st of August, 1835. Sally Hill, (L. S.) Test -- B. F. DUNCAN."
      The subscribing witness also swore, that the horse described in the writing was worth not more than five dollars. Another witness testified that it was worth thirty dollars. And another proved that, not long after the date of the writing, he saw the six ten dollar notes in the possession of the obligor, who said he had found them, and requested him to deliver them to Sally Hill, which he accordingly attempted; but she refused to receive them.
      (MAD: more not included here)
      Wherefore, it is our opinion, that the compromise relied on in the County Court, was insufficient to bar or arrest the proceeding which had been legally commenced, and was properly pending; and the more especially, as the relator herself was in Court and opposed the discharge of Turner.
      And as the order discharging him on that ground, might, if unreversed, bar any further proceeding against him, therefore, it is considered and adjudged, that the said order be and the same is hereby set aside and annulled, and the case remanded to the County Court.
 

"Reports of select cases decided in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky" ("Kentucky Reports" [Vol.] 34-35 - DANA IV-V) by James G. Dana, in 9 Volumes, Vol.V; Vol.35, pg.127 to 135 (California State Law Library 12/2003)
      JENNINGS' Executors against DAVIS and WHEELER; Court of Appeals of Kentucky; 35 Ky. 127; 5 Dana 127; April 13, 1837, Decided.
      From the Circuit Court for Garrard County.
      Judge EWING delivered the Opinion of the Court -- held, for this case, by Judges Ewing and Marshall only. WILLIAM DAVIS, by his last will, made in 1816, directed his executors to sell all his estate, except the part left to his wife during her life, and to divide the proceeds equally among his children, except James, to whom he gave nothing, and Rebecca, to whom he gave one hundred dollars more, and Duncan, his son-in-law, fifty dollars less than the rest. And directed his executors, after his wife's death, to sell the part left to her, and divide the proceeds equally among his children, except James. He directed the money left to his daughter Rebecca, "to be placed in the hands of William Jennings, as her trustee, for her use and benefit, and to be handed out to her only as she, in his discretion, may need the same, in order for her necessary clothing and boarding," and in the event of the death of said Jennings, before the death of his daughter, he directed the County Court to appoint some fit person to manage her estate. And appointed James Thompson and William Jennings his executors; the latter of whom took upon himself the execution of the will, and the said trust.
      Rebecca went to Jennings' shortly after her fathers death, and was boarded and clothed by him, until his death, which took place in 1831; he having previously made his will, and appointed his son John his sole executor; who took upon himself the execution of the will.
      John Jennings, also, departed this life in a short time, having previously made his will, and appointed G. Robertson and R. P. Letcher his executors; who, also, took upon themselves the execution of his will.
      The County Court of Garrard, after the death of William Jennings, in conformity to the directions of the will of Davis, appointed William Wheeler trustee, to manage the estate of Rebecca.
      Wheeler and Rebecca then united in filing their bill against John Jennings, as the executor of the trustee, William Jennings, and after the death of John, revived their suit against Robertson and Letcher, his executors.
      On the hearing, the Circuit Court decreed that, Robertson and Letcher, as executors of William Jennings, pay out of the assets of said Jennings in their hands, to William Wheeler, as trustee, $909.03, and costs. From which decree, the defendants have brought the case to this Court by writ of error.
      It is first objected that, Wheeler and Rebecca have been improperly joined in the bill; and if they have not, that the proper parties are not before the court.
      It was certainly proper for Wheeler and Rebecca to unite in the bill. Wheeler had been appointed trustee, by the County Court, and as such, had a right to have the money decreed to be paid over to him, to be applied, by him for the use and benefit of his cestui que use, as directed by the will, under which he derived his authority; and Rebecca was equitably interested in the fund sought to be recovered, and should be before the Court, in a controversy in which her interest is so deeply involved. And we know of no more favorable attitude, which she could be made to occupy, than to be joined with her trustee as complainant.
      Though William Jennings is alleged in the bill to have been executor, as well as trustee, it may be construed, without doing violence to its terms, to present a proceeding for an account, and payment over, of the trust fund which had come to the hands of Jennings, as trustee, and not as executor.
      The bill, after detailing the history of the case, concludes by alleging, "that John Jennings, though often requested, had not paid over to William Wheeler, the amount of estate, which had been received by William Jennings as trustee for your oratrix, and which remained in his hands at his death. Nor has the said John adjusted the accounts of the said trust." This is the burthen of complaint, and the grounds for the remedy sought. And though, in the forepart of the bill, his appointment and qualification, as executor, are stated, and that a large sum came to his hands as such; and in the latter part the defendant is called upon to exhibit an account of the sums received by William Jennings, as executor, and trustee -- the former may be regarded as a historic detail of facts; the latter as a call for a discovery of the amount of the whole estate of Davis, as a mean of ascertaining the amount which had come to his hands as trustee.
      If the proceeding be against the representatives of Jennings, for an account of the trust fund only, which remained in his hands as trustee, at his death, then it was wholly unnecessary to bring the other executor, or other legatees of Davis, before the Court.
      But if the bill be construed to present two aspects, one against Jennings as executor, the other against him as trustee, and the decree can be sustained in one aspect, without bringing other parties before the Court, that aspect should be assumed and adopted by this Court, to sustain the decree. It would not only be entirely useless, but vexatious, for this Court to reverse the decree, and send it back, because other parties may be necessary, in one aspect of the case, when the decree, as rendered, is sustainable in another aspect, fairly and fully presented in the bill, without requiring other parties to be made.
      And it would be equally useless and vexatious, for the Circuit Court to dismiss a bill, because proper parties were not brought before the Court, when, in one aspect, the bill could be sustained without them.
      It is true that, Jennings, as trustee, could not be made liable for any of the estate of Davis which rightfully remained in the hands of his, Davis', executors, unadministered, unless he had been guilty of negligence in failing to reduce it to his possession as trustee.
      But the lapse of time that has intervened, since he took on himself the execution of the will of Davis, being about twenty years, and since the death of the widow, being about sixteen years, raises a strong presumption that the estate has been fully administered, and each legatee's interest paid over to him; and Rebecca's to Jennings as her trustee. No other reasonable presumption can arise, if Jennings, as executor, has done his duty. And this presumption is strengthened, and rendered conclusive, by the admission of the defendants, in their answer, that each of the other legatee's interest, has been paid over to him.
      We conclude, therefore, that the whole interest of Rebecca in her father's estate has come to the hands of Jennings, as her trustee, and that he is accountable for the whole amount, in his character of trustee. If so, it was only necessary to bring him, or his representative, before the Court in that character, and no others.
      The commissioner appointed, by the Court, to audit the accounts &c. and report to the Court, has estimated the personal services of Rebecca, together with the interest upon her trust fund, as equivalent to her maintenance -- board and clothing, and the personal services and care of Jennings, in superintending her estate; and has reported accordingly. And the decree is rendered upon this estimate and view of the case; which, is fully sustained by a clear preponderance of proof.
      It is contended, by the counsel of Jennings' representatives, that nothing should be allowed for the personal services of Rebecca, whilst she resided with and was boarded by Jennings. And secondly, that the trustee is not chargeable with interest upon the trust fund in his hands.
      The personal services of Rebecca and the use of the money were both taken into the estimate, in the report which is made.
      We can perceive no principle of equity that would justify the rejection of her personal services. Though of weak mind, and subject to occasional fits of intemperance, she was able to perform and seems to have been generally engaged in, the most slavish and menial services towards the support and clothing of herself, and for the use and benefit of Jennings.
      Those services should surely go towards lessening the amount justly chargeable against her for her maintenance.
      Had she been placed as a boarder, under the care of any other, with the understanding that she was to render what service she could, her boarding and maintenance could certainly have been procured, upon much better terms, than if she was to do nothing in the way of service.
      Nor is there any thing, in the terms of the will, creating the trust, from which it can be implied, that she was to be exempt from all service, or exertion, and was to depend upon the trust fund exclusively for her support. Indeed, its terms, connected with her ability to labor, would lead to a contrary conclusion. It was to be paid out to her as she, in the trustee's discretion, might need it. She was able to labor, and like all other able bodied persons, should be engaged in some useful occupation, and cannot be properly said to need the money, except to supply those necessaries which her reasonable exertions could not supply.
      Nor will it avail, that no specific charge is made in the bill for services. The complainants do not seek to recover pay for the services. They only set up a claim for an account and settlement of the trust fund. The defendants, by way of reducing the amount, set up a claim for the support and maintenance of Rebecca. And as an abatement and reduction of that claim, the complainants set up the services of Rebecca. The allegations of the bill are sufficiently broad to justify the inquiry and abatement for the services.
      We are also satisfied, from a full review of the authorities, as well as from the reason and propriety of the case, that the trustee is chargeable with interest. The trust fund was placed in his hands, to be paid out to her as she might need it. It was intended for her support during her life. Small amounts at a time were sufficient for this purpose. And the trustee might well calculate the probable amount that would be required from year to year; and should not, as a prudent discreet man, intrusted as a confidential agent and friend of the testator, to manage the estate of an unfortunate daughter, permit the surplus to lie idle and unproductive in his hands, no more than he should permit, houses, or improved farms, if such had been the property vested in him, to lie idle and untenanted. Having undertaken the trust, it was his duty to loan out the surplus, and render it as profitable to his cestui que trust as he reasonable could. A trust is looked upon, in Chancery, as a matter of honor and conscience, and undertaken with humane, friendly, benevolent or charitable motives.
      The most important and delicate interests are generally committed to the hands of a trustee, as a conscientious, faithful and prudent friend of the donor. As such, he should use the powers vested in him. As a prudent, discreet, conscientious friend, he should loan out the surplus of the trust fund on safe securities, or otherwise vest it so as best to promote the benevolent ends of the trust. If he does not, but permits it to lie idle, he is guilty of a deriliction of duty, unworthy of the confidence reposed, and should be made responsible for at least legal interest.
      Besides, there is no evidence that he permitted it to lie idle, or that he did not loan it out, or put it to use. And as it was his duty to do so, the presumption is that he, as a faithful agent, did do it. And if he used it, or intermingled it with his own funds, thereby making it subserve the purposes of credit, or made profit out of it, or loaned it out, he is unquestionably liable for interest.
      In support of these views, the most abundant authorities are to be found. (MAD: not copied here)
      It is true that, this Court, in some respects, has established a different rule in relation to executors and administrators, as trustees of the funds committed to them. But this difference has grown out of their peculiar duties and functions, as prescribed by our statutes. They are required to pay the debts, and distribute the surplus among the legatees or distributees, as soon as may be. It is no part of their duty to lend it out, or to vest it in securities, and they are not responsible if they fail to do so. Nor is it any part of their duty, as settled by this Court, to make profit out of the distributable funds in their hands. But their duty is always to hold it ready, to pay over to those entitled, as the law directs. Their attitude, functions and duties are altogether different from those of the trustee in the case before the Court. His attitude and duties are more analogous to those of our guardian, who holds the money for the use and support of his ward, the surplus to be paid over to him, when he arrives at age. The trustee in this case holds it for the use and support of his cestui que use, as she may need it. As the guardian's duty is to lend it out, and he is made responsible for interest, if he fail to do so -- so, also, should it be the duty of the trustee to lend it out, and he should be made responsible, if he fail to do so.
      An account of disbursements by the trustee, is exhibited, without any proof to sustain it. And it is contended, that it should be allowed. There is nothing in the will which can be construed as intending to place the trustee beyond accountability, nor are we apprised of any rule of evidence, which would justify the admission of items of disbursements, in his case, more than in the case of any other fiduciary or trustee, without proof. Credits that are set up, in this, as well as all other cases, must be sustained by proof. Very slight proof it is admitted, would be sufficient in a case like the present. -- Any proof that would suffice to raise a presumption that the disbursements were made.
      But if the account be admitted, as it is made up of articles procured for the support and clothing of Rebecca, and as the report of the commissioner, sustained by the proof, balances her personal services and the interest upon her money, against the cost of her maintenance and clothing, those items whatever they may have been, are covered and liquidated by the decree as rendered.
      It is, also, worthy of remark, that her personal services and the interest upon her money, is not only, by the report and proof, made to balance the charges and disbursements, for her maintenance, but also, to compensate the trustee, for superintending her estate and person. And it certainly is a question, whether a trustee is entitled to any compensation for his personal services, care and pains in superintending the trust fund, other than for just charges, expenses and responsibilities, incurred in managing the fund.
      Chancery looks on trusts, generally, as honorary, and not undertaken with mercenary motives. (MAD: more not copied here)
      But whether such allowance should be made to other trustees, or other compensation for pains and care, other than for reasonable charges, disbursements and costs, is not necessary to be determined in this case.
      If compensation should not be made, then is there still less ground for complaint against the decree, on the part of the plaintiffs in error.
      If compensation be allowed, other than as above restricted, that compensation has been allowed in the report and decree, and has been liquidated and settled by the interest upon the trust fund and the personal services of Rebecca.
      The decree of the Circuit Court should therefore be affirmed.
      (MAD: Thomas Duncan mar. Hannah Davis 8/27/1811; Deed E-342, 1/14/1817, Thomas Duncan to Isarel Davis, my interest in my mother-in-laws estate at her death, but not anything under the will of William Davis decd; Deed E-418, 6/18/1817, Thomas Duncan for love to my step-daughter Sally Davis, all my estate except my horse, bridle and saddle.)
 

"Reports of cases at common law and in equity decided in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Winter term 1848 and Summer term 1849" ("Kentucky Reports" [Vol.] 48 - MONROE IX) by Ben. Monroe, Vol.IX; Vol.48, pg.351 to 355 (California State Law Library 12/2003)
      STEMMONS and YATES vs DUNCAN'S Heirs; Case No. 74, Court of Appeals of Kentucky; 48 Ky. 351; 9 B. Mon. 351; February 1, 1848, Decided.
      Error to the Garrard Circuit.
      JUDGE BRECK delivered the opinion of the Court -- which was suspended until the present term, and petition for re-hearing filed and overruled. ALFRED HOCKER, to indemnify Benjamin Duncan and M. A. Stemmons as his sureties, executed a mortgage to them, upon a tavern house and lot in the town of Stanford, and subsequently executed two other mortgages upon the same and other property, to other individuals.
      Suits in chancery for a foreclosure having been instituted by the mortgagees under each mortgage, and the same consolidated, the tavern property, under a consent decree, was sold, and Stemmons became the purchaser, and executed bond to the commissioner, with Duncan, his co-mortgagee, &c., as his surety. The report of the commissioner was returned into Court and confirmed. The proceeds of the sale were not sufficient for the indemnity of the elder mortgagees, but no decree was rendered directing their distribution. Duncan having departed this life after the sale, his executor, heirs and widow, were made parties, and upon the motion and affidavit of Benjamin F. Duncan, the executor and one of the heirs, a rule was awarded against Stemmons to show cause why the tavern property should not be conveyed jointly to said Stemmons and the heirs and widow of his co-mortgagee.
      The relief sought by the rule was resisted by Stemmons and Yates, who was a junior mortgagee, and had obtained the possession of the property from Hocker, and which he still held, and who had also purchased from Stemmons, after his purchase under the decree, whatever interest he had in the premises.
      The plaintiff in the rule, introduced one Myers as a witness, but as he only proved the declarations of Stemmons in regard to the circumstances under which he made the purchase, and which were made after his sale to Yates, we are of opinion his testimony was incompetent as to Yates, and that the exceptions to it as to him, were well taken.
      Stemmons himself, however, was examined upon oath, and was, we think, a competent witness. He proves the following facts: -- That he and Duncan, his co-mortgagee, were joint sureties for Hocker to one Shanks, upon a note for $1,200, which they jointly paid off, and in consequence thereof sought and obtained the decree for a sale of the property in contest -- that before the sale he and Duncan had a conversation upon the subject of purchasing in the property for their joint use and benefit, but came to no definite agreement. When he purchased the property, however, he considered he purchased it for himself and Duncan jointly. That when asked after the sale by a son of Duncan whether he and his father were joint in the purchase, he replied he supposed so. That some time afterwards he sold all the interest acquired by his purchase in the property, to Yates, estimating the same as one half, for just as much as he had to pay on his half the debt to Shanks. That Yates was to have the whole property if he, Stemmons, acquired it by his purchase, and if not, whatever he did acquire. That he and Duncan having the oldest mortgage, were entitled jointly to the entire proceeds of the sale. That he had paid nothing on the sale bond, considering the amount thereof as coming to him and Duncan. That when he sold to Yates he explained to him his interest and claim, which was only estimated in their contract at one half. That as between him and Duncan, he was willing for him to have one half, but his feelings were with Yates to obtain the whole, as he had suffered largely by Hocker, and besides that, he, Stemmons, was not upon friendly terms with some of the plaintiffs in the motion. That after his purchase he only paid one half the tavern tax upon the property, informing the collector that Duncan was bound for the other half, and he believed his son and executor had paid it. That there was no writing between him and Duncan in regard to the purchase, and that no part of the purchase money had been paid by him, except that he and Duncan were each entitled to one half of the proceeds of sale. That he had purchased the property upon his own responsibility, without Duncan's being bound by his purchase, but that between him and Duncan, he would only contend for one half. That he had sold his interest to Yates for about $800, a sum sufficient to indemnify him for the amount which he had been compelled to pay as surety for Hocker.
      It further appears that the property had been sold or struck off to Stemmons at the price of $350, and there is nothing showing that either Stemmons or Duncan were, to any extent, otherwise indemnified as the sureties of Hocker, than by the mortgage upon the property in contest.
      Upon this state of fact the Court below directed an undivided moiety of the property to be conveyed to the widow and heirs of Duncan and the other to Stemmons.
      To reverse that decree Yates, in the name of Stemmons, and also in his own name, prosecutes this writ of error.
      It is not perceived upon what principle the widow was included among the grantees, to whom a moiety of the property was directed to be conveyed. She may have been a devisee under the will of her husband, which is not in the record. But whether properly included or not, is not material. It was not to the prejudice of either Yates or Stemmons, and they cannot, therefore, although an error, render it available.
      But it is contended the decree is otherwise erroneous, not sustained by the testimony or the law.
      In regard to the testimony, we have had little difficulty in coming to the conclusion that Stemmons bid in the property for the joint use of himself and Duncan, or in other words, that they were joint purchasers.
      They were joint sureties -- had each paid an equal portion of the surety debt -- they jointly, at the time, held the mortgage title to the property, and which is still held by Duncan's representatives and Stemmons -- the sale, in view of the whole case and of all the cases, may be assumed to have been for their joint benefit and they became jointly liable for the purchase money, if it should even be held otherwise, they were joint complainants, and we think, should be regarded as joint purchasers. The very attitude of the parties, independent of the testimony of Stemmons, seems to authorize this conclusion, and more especially in view of the comparatively small amount for which the property was sold. It is not credible that Duncan would have stood by and seen the property thus sacrificed, except upon the ground that it was to be still jointly liable for the indemnity of both Stemmons and himself. But the testimony of Stemmons not only fortifies but irresistibly forces upon us this conclusion.
      He says expressly he considered the purchase as so made; and by his subsequent declarations and acts, requiring Duncan or his representatives to pay one half the town tax, and in his very sale to Yates, he emphatically treated the purchase as a joint one and elected so to consider it. He says he paid nothing upon the sale bond, as he considered the proceeds of the sale belonging to him and Duncan. Duncan's representatives, therefore, held the title in conjunction with Stemmons, and ought not to be deprived of it, but are equitably entitled to have it perfected.
      Of this Stemmons himself does not complain and Yates surely, has no cause to complain, as he really purchased but a moiety and will obtain, therefore, all he purchased.
      But objection is made to this mode of proceeding.
      In view of this question, it will be recollected that no conveyance had been made to Stemmons, that the suits in which the decree for a sale had been made, still remained upon the docket, and the decree open and unexecuted.
      It seems to us, under the circumstances, it was clearly in the power of the Court in this way to decide, to whom the conveyance should be made, without compelling the party to resort to a separate independent suit.
      Duncan's heirs, Stemmons and Yates were all parties to the suits, in which the sale had been decreed and made. Yates voluntarily appeared as a party to the rule and resisted the relief sought by it. He occupied the attitude of an assignee under Stemmons, had purchased his interest, estimated and defined as a moiety only, and with full notice of the claim of Duncan.
      It is the practice in Courts, both of law and equity, even when no suit is pending, upon proper notice, to take cognizance and decide important controversies upon motion and by rule.
      In this case the matter in controversy is the right of property, which had been sold by order of the Chancellor, in suits still pending and within his control.
      To have directed the property to be conveyed to Stemmons, and then by a decree in an original and independent suit, to have decreed him to convey a moiety of it to Duncan's heirs, would have been an expensive, useless and idle circuity. It seems to us that justice has been done and that neither Stemmons nor Yates has any cause to complain, and the decree is, therefore, affirmed.
 

"Kentucky Opinions containing unreported opinions of the Court of Appeals" 1871 to 1872, by Hon. J. Morgan Chinn, Clerk, Vol.4; Kentucky Opinions, Vol.4, pg.544 (California State Law Library, Sacramento, 2/2004)
      MARY S. YANTIS et al. v. B. F. DUNCAN'S Admr. et al; Court of Appeals of Kentucky; 4 Ky. Op. 544; May 10, 1871, Decided.
      Headnote: Fraudulent conveyance. Parent to Child. Deed to daughter held fraudulent.
      Opinion of the Court by Judge Lindsay:
      The two deeds under which Mrs. Yantis claims the property adjudged by the court to be sold in satisfaction of appellees' judgment, present upon their faces intrinsic evidence that her father is the real owner of the property, and that her name is only being used to protect him in the enjoyment of the same. In addition to this, the proof in the case, even that of the father himself, when considered in connection with the evasive and unsatisfactory answer of Mrs. Yantis and husband, can leave no doubt but that the father caused the lots to be conveyed to his daughter for the fraudulent purpose of protecting it from his creditors.
      Judgment affirmed.
 

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