Duncan research files of
"Reports of Cases Determined in The Supreme Court of the State of California" by W.W. Cope, Reporter, Vol.71; pgs.384 to 392 (El Dorado Co. CA Law Library 12/2003)
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. R.H. JOHNSON, Appellant; No. 20232, Supreme Court of California; 71 Cal. 384; 12 P. 261; December 7, 1886.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo County.
The defendant was arrested on a warrant issued on a complaint filed on the 18th of January, 1886, before one A.C. Ruggles, a justice of the peace of Cache Creek township, Yolo County, and while in custody of the sheriff under this warrant, was again arrested on a warrant issued on a complaint filed on the 27th of March, 1886, before one H.C. Duncan, a justice of the peace of another township in the same county. On the last-named day the defendant was committed by Duncan, and on this commitment the information under which the defendant was tried and convicted was filed. On the 11th of June, 1886, the sheriff, on the warrant issued by Ruggles, took the defendant before him, and he was thereupon discharged. ... The judgment is reversed and set aside, with direction to the court below to render and enter an appropriate judgment.
"Reports of Cases Determined in The Supreme Court of the State of California" by C.P. Pomeroy, Reporter, Vol.120; pgs.634 to 640 (El Dorado Co. CA Law Library 12/2003)
In the Matter of the Estate of THEODORE E. WEED, Deceased. MARY L. GOLDY, Appellant, v. H.C. DUNCAN, Public Administrator, Respondent; Sac. No. 379, Supreme Court of California, Department Two; 120 Cal. 634; 53 P. 30; April 26, 1898.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Yolo County granting letters of administration to the public administrator, and refusing letters to the next of kin of a deceased person, and from an order denying a new trial.
(opinion by Judge Belcher:) Theodore E. Weed died intestate in the county of Yolo, in this state, on the twenty-sixth day of March, 1896, being at that time a resident of said county, and leaving an estate therein, consisting of real and personal property, of the value of about twenty thousand dollars. He left no wife or children and no next of kin residing in this state, unless the appellant, Mary L. Goldy, was so residing.
On April 2, 1896, H.C. Duncan, the public administrator of the county, duly filed a petition praying that letters of administration upon the said estate be issued to him, and thereafter, on the thirteenth day of the same month, Mary L. Goldy filed her petition, stating that she was a niece of said decedent, and praying that letters of administration upon the estate be issued to her.
The two petitions were heard together, and thereafter, on June 5, 1896, the court made and filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ordered and adjudged that letters of administration on the estate be issued to the petitioner, H.C. Duncan. The court found "that the petitioner, Mary L. Goldy, was not a bona fide resident of this state at the time her petition was filed herein, nor was she a bona fide resident of this state at the time of the trial, " and as a conclusion of law that she was not competent or entitled to serve as administratrix.
There are two appeals in the case. The first was taken August 3, 1896, and is from the order granting the petition of the public administrator for letters of administration upon the estate of said deceased and refusing appellant's application for such letters; and the second was taken February 7, 1897, and is from an order denying appellant's motion for a new trial.
Appellant contends that the findings were not justified by the evidence, and whether they were justified or not is the only question which need be considered.
At the hearing J.W. Hughes was called as a witness for appellant and testified that he had been the legal adviser of the said deceased for many years, and at the time of his death had in his possession many of his papers. He then stated: "Upon the death of Mr. Weed I telegraphed the fact to his relatives at Stamford, Connecticut, and for some of them to come out and take charge of the estate. In response to my telegram, a brother of Mrs. Goldy came out immediately; he had never been in California before. I learned from him that his sister, Mrs. Goldy, had some years before lived in California, and in response to telegrams she came out, and on arriving at my office in Sacramento signed her petition for letters of administration herein. Several telegrams passed between us. I can produce them." On objection of counsel for appellant the telegrams were excluded by the court.
S.N. Goldy, the husband of appellant, was called as a witness and testified, in substance, that his business was that of a civil engineer, and that he and his wife came to San Francisco in 1889 and rented a furnished flat at No. 180 Clinton Park in said city, where they lived until the summer of 1891, when they went east; that when he came to San Francisco he established an office on California street in that city, and when he went east he did so for the purpose of perfecting an invention on which he was then at work and obtaining patents thereon; that he then expected it would require eighteen months or two years to perfect his invention and obtain patents thereon, and intended, as soon as that should be accomplished, to return to San Francisco and establish a business there in connection with his invention; that his invention was a machine for cutting and polishing hard woods, making chair rounds, wagon and buggy spokes, fancy house furnishings, moldings and picture frames, and working up all character of hard wood requiring a high polish, and that the Pacific coast, and particularly San Francisco, was peculiarly adapted to the establishment of such a business; that in 1890 he registered and voted in San Francisco, and ever since he moved there in 1889 he had always considered and still considered that city his home, and had no other plans than to reside there and carry on the business above described; that while in the east he registered at hotels as from San Francisco, and spent most of his time at Bridgeport, Connecticut, where he had a friend, engaged in the foundry and machine business, whom he employed to construct the greater portion of the castings and other parts of his invention which were made of iron and steel and could be constructed more cheaply there than in California.
On cross-examination, the witness testified that he arrived in Sacramento the day before the trial, and that he had not been in San Francisco since he left there in the summer of 1891; that he completed the construction of his machine five or six months before he heard of the death of Mr. Weed, and had not made any preparation to return to California.
He was then asked by counsel for respondent:
"Q. If your machine can be more economically constructed in the east, and the hard woods procured there in large quantities, what reason can you give for saying that you intended to return to California? A. Well, I expected to go into the business of fruit raising with Mr. --, who was to furnish the capital.
"Q. Where did you expect to locate your fruit farm? A. At Redding, California.
"Q. Where is Mr. --? A. He is dead. He died about two years ago."
Mrs. Goldy was also called as a witness in her own behalf, and testified substantially as her husband did in regard to their coming to San Francisco in 1889, residing there until 1891, and then returning east. She said: "During all the time of our absence I considered California as our home, and intended to return to this state. I might not have returned so soon if it had not been for the death of my uncle."
And on cross-examination she said: "When we went east in 1891 we gave up our rooms and took everything we owned with us." "While in Bridgeport we rented rooms already furnished, . . . . where we lived for over two years. We were living there when we heard of uncle's death. My husband always returned to Bridgeport when away on business." "I would not have returned to California when I did had not uncle died. I came out to administer on his estate, and signed the petition for administration the day I arrived in Sacramento, before I went to San Francisco. When we heard of uncle's death my brother started for California, expecting to administer on the estate. . . . After my brother arrived in California we found out that he could not administer on the estate, and, as I had at one time lived in California, they had me come out to administer on the estate. I am living in the same rooms in San Francisco that we occupied at No. 180 Clinton Park in 1890. I found them vacant and rented them by the month already furnished."
The above was, in substance, all the evidence given at the hearing, and the question is, Does it appear therefrom that appellant was a bona fide resident of this state at the time she made her application for letters, or at the time of the trial? If not, she was, under our statute (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1369), incompetent to serve as administratrix, and her application was properly denied.
Whether appellant was a bona fide resident of the state or not was a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the court.
We have no statute declaring what acts are necessary to constitute a bona fide residence in this state, but there are several provisions in the codes in relation to residence and nonresidence. Among others are the following: Section 52 of the Political Code, under the heading: "Persons composing the people of the state," provides: "Every person has, in law, a residence. In determining the place of residence, the following rules are to be observed: 1. It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he returns in seasons of repose; 2. There can only be one residence; 3. A residence cannot be lost until another is gained; . . . . 5. The residence of the husband is the residence of the wife; . . . . 7. The residence can be changed only by the union of act and intent."
Section 1239 of the same code, in regard to the residence of persons claiming a right to vote in this state, provides: "1. That place must be considered and held to be the residence of a person in which his habitation is fixed, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning; . . . . 6. If a person remove to another state with the intention of making it his residence he loses his residence in this state. 7. If a person remove to another state with the intention of remaining there for an indefinite time, and as a place of residence, he loses his residence in this state, notwithstanding he entertains an intention of returning at some future time."
We see no conflict in the above provisions, and they are therefore to be construed together as parts of the same statute. (Pol. Code, sec. 4480.) And in accordance with the law as thus declared, Mr. Freeman, in his note to Berry v. Wilcox, 48 Am. St. Rep. 714, states the rule to be as follows: "If a person actually removes to another place with an intention of remaining there for an indefinite time, and as a place of present domicile, it becomes his place of residence or domicile, notwithstanding he may have a floating intention to return to his old residence at some future time." (Citing several cases.)
The question then is, Did Goldy and his wife lose their residence in California when they moved east, taking with them all of their property, and established a residence there which they maintained for nearly five years? That their return to the east was for an indefinite time was shown by the fact that it was to perfect an invention and construct a machine, which he expected would require eighteen months or two years, but which was not in fact completed until five or six months before he heard of the death of Mr. Weed. And after it was completed he made no preparations to return to California.
At the commencement of his testimony Mr. Goldy stated: "I reside at 180 Clinton Park, San Francisco, California, and have resided there since the year 1889," but this was evidently a mere fiction of the imagination. Further on he stated that, as soon as his invention should be perfected and patents obtained therefor he intended to return to San Francisco, and "to introduce and establish a business in connection with said invention." But this was inconsistent with other portions of his testimony, and particularly with his statement that, as a reason for returning to California, he expected to go into the business of fruit raising at Redding with a man who had been dead for two years at the time of the trial.
Mrs. Goldy came back to California to administer on the estate, and on the day of her arrival in the state she signed her application for appointment as administratrix. She left her husband at their home in the east and would not have come at that time if her uncle had not died. But her husband's residence was her residence, and if he then had no bona fide residence in this state we fail to see how she could have had. To be a bona fide resident of the state one must really and in good faith have established a home or place of residence therein, where he lives, and to which when away on business or pleasure he returns.
We conclude, therefore, in view of all the evidence, that both Mr. and Mrs. Goldy lost their residence in this state when they left the state in 1891 and went east to live.
But it is urged that, conceding appellant lost her residence in California when she went east with her husband, she regained it immediately upon her return to the state, and became, therefore, entitled by her new residence to letters in preference to the public administrator. Counsel say: "From the moment she set her foot on California soil, in April, 1896, and declared her intention to be a resident of the state, and to remain permanently within its borders, she became a bona fide resident of California, just the same as though she had been born here and never passed beyond its limits."
This theory cannot, in our opinion, be sustained; and in effect a similar theory was, in the case of In re Donovan, 104 Cal. 623, held untenable.
It results that both of the orders appealed from should be affirmed.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion both the orders appealed from are affirmed.
"Reports of Cases Determined in The Supreme Court of the State of California" by C.P. Pomeroy, Reporter, Vol.117; pgs.412 to 417 (El Dorado Co. CA Law Library 12/2003; MAD's extract)
BANK OF WOODLAND, Appellant, v. B.F. DUNCAN, Respondent; Sac. No. 229, Supreme Court of California, Department Two; 117 Cal. 412; 49 P. 414; June 24, 1897.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo County and from an order denying a new trial.
Replevin for four hundred and fifty sacks of wheat, part of the crop grown during the cropping season of 1892-93 by J.R. and B.F. Davisson on certain large tracts of land farmed by them as copartners in Yolo county. Said copartners made two negotiable promissory notes in favor of one Wolf Levy, the first dated November 9, 1892, for the sum of $4500, and the second dated April 5, 1893, for $2958.78, each payable with interest one month from its date, and each secured by a separate mortgage executed by the Davissons upon their said crop growing and to be grown. It was provided in each mortgage that the mortgagors would care for and protect the mortgaged crop while growing and until fit for harvest, and then faithfully harvest, thresh sack, and deliver the same immediately into the possession of said Levy or his assigns, to be held and disposed of for the payment of the debt secured thereby; that in case of the default of the mortgagors in any of those particulars the mortgagee or his assigns might protect, harvest, etc., the crop, and the expenses incurred in that behalf should be secured by the mortgage and be first payable from the proceeds of sale; that the mortgagee or his assigns should upon the harvesting of the crop be entitled to the immediate possession thereof and to haul and store and sell the same, applying the net proceeds to the payment of the note secured by the mortgage, and rendering the overplus, if any, to the mortgagors. Both mortgages were duly recorded. The consideration was prior indebtedness of the Davissons to Levy at the date of the notes respectively. Levy in turn was indebted to the Bank of Woodland, plaintiff here, in a large amount, and forthwith after the receipt of each of said notes and before the maturity thereof he indorsed and delivered the same together with the mortgage by which it was secured to the plaintiff as collateral for his indebtedness to the latter. There was no formal assignment of the mortgages apart from the indorsement and delivery of the notes. Concurrently with the execution of the mortgages Levy orally agreed with the Davissons that he would advance to them money "upon the security of the mortgages" for the purpose of harvesting their crops, and threshing, sacking, and otherwise protecting the same; and it had been his custom to make to them advances for similar purposes during a series of six or eight years before the transactions here in question. In June and July, 1893, Duncan, the defendant, under employment of the Davissons, headed part of the crop, for which service they became indebted to him in the sum of $590.00; they gave him an order for this sum on Levy, who refused payment, though it seems that previous to this time -- the close of July, 1893 -- he had honored some similar demands of the Davissons; thereupon the Davissons directed defendant to take from the grain -- which had then been threshed and sacked but was yet lying in the fields where it was grown -- enough to secure his said account; accordingly he removed the wheat for which he is now sued; it was not taken from that part of the crop headed by him. Defendant took the wheat against the protest of plaintiff's agents; plaintiff was asserting claim to it and was itself preparing to remove the same; whether it had acquired actual possession is a disputed point, but not important to be decided. Upon the commencement of the action plaintiff obtained possession of the wheat by process of claim and delivery, and before the trial sold the same together with the rest of the crop, credited the proceeds on the notes and also to Levy's account, and reindorsed the notes to Levy without recourse -- there being a balance unpaid on them. Defendant pleaded the facts of such sale and retransfer by way of supplemental answer. He also filed a cross-complaint asserting his right to possession of the wheat in controversy, and that plaintiff wrongfully took the same, to his damage to the amount of his account against the Davissons, for which he prayed judgment. The judgment was that plaintiff take nothing and that defendant recover as prayed in his cross-complaint. ... The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed.
"Reports of Cases Determined in The Supreme Court of the State of California" by C.P. Pomeroy, Reporter, Vol.124; pgs.106 to 107 (El Dorado Co. CA Law Library 12/2003; MAD's extract)
W.G. DUNCAN et al., Respondents, v. F.M. CURRY et al., Appellants; Sac. No. 511, Supreme Court of California, Department Two; 124 Cal. 106; 56 P. 898; March 24, 1899.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo County.
This is an action to foreclose a mortgage executed by the defendants F.M. Curry and his wife, A.V. Curry. Judgment was rendered in the court below foreclosing the mortgage as against both defendants; and the defendants appeal from the judgment, and particularly from that part of it which decrees that the lien of the mortgage is paramount to a certain homestead right set up in the answer. On the twenty-fourth day of November, 1894, the appellants, husband and wife, executed the mortgage in question, which, however, was never recorded. On December 14, 1895, the appellant A.V. Curry, the wife, duly executed a declaration of homestead upon the mortgaged premises, which was on said day duly recorded; and it was contended by appellants that this declaration of homestead defeats the mortgage lien. ... The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
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